Quine. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” - University of San ...

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Two Dogmas of EmpiricismThe Analytic Synthetic Distinction andReductionism Quine s goalsModern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas .
One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths whichare analytic or grounded in meanings independently of matters of factand truths which are synthetic or grounded in fact The other dogmais reductionism the belief that each meaningful statement isequivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to.
immediate experience One effect of abandoning them is a blurringof the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics andnatural science Another effect is a shift toward pragmatism Negative trashing the two dogmas of logical positivism the analytic synthetic distinction.
reductionism Positive naturalizing philosophy Understanding ontology as a matter of pragmatic decision comparable to the natural sciences Quine s plan.
Debunk the two central dogmas of Logical Positivism Empiricism using circularity arguments to show that we can t come up with anadequate non question begging account of analyticity is so out go The analytic synthetic distinction Reductionism the belief that each meaningful factual .
statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon termswhich refer to immediate experience Naturalizing philosophy by blurring the supposed boundary between speculativemetaphysics and natural science which reflects the distinction.
between analytic and synthetic sentences where the former are supposed to be the business of philosophy andthe latter the business of the natural sciences The Circularity Arguments Background for analyticity.
A statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings andindependent of fact Kant an analytic statement is one that attributes to its subject nomore than is already conceptually contained in the subject Necessary and contingent propositions Leibniz truth of reason .
vs truths of fact A statement is necessary iff it is true at all possible worlds i e it is not logically possible thatit be false Leibniz its denial is self contradictory.
A statement is contingent iff it is not necessary Problems Kant s definition restricts the definition to sentences in subject predicate form and is metaphorical what do we mean by contained .
What is meaning What is synonomy sameness of meaning What are logical possibility and necessity What is self contradiction And what on earth are possible worlds Analyticity as truth in virtue of meaning.
Proposal a sentence is analytic iff true in virtue ofmeanings and independent of fact Problem What is MEANING The meaning of an expression in the sense that interests usis not its reference or extension .
The extension of a singular term is the object it names The extension of a general term or predicate is the setof objects of which the general term is true The extensions of some predicates is brown .
Ducati the desk in S 312 is married to Justinian Theodora Barak Michelle R S M Baber H E Baber prefers to .
Krugman Clinton Obama Ducati Baber s shoe ChewToy Meanings Intensions Problem Analyticity has to be understood in terms ofmeanings intensions rather than extensions of terms.
But what are these intensions anyway Properties Individual concepts or Fregean senses Quine speaks Once the theory of meaning is sharplyseparated from the theory of reference it is a short step torecognizing as the business of a theory of meaning simply.
the synonomy of linguistic forms and the analyticity ofstatements meanings themselves as obscure intermediaryentities may well be abandoned We don t need intentions providing we can give anaccount of synonomy and analyticity .
Paraphrasing away bad thingsAlice and Betty are of the same height Surface grammar suggests that this attributes a 3 placerelation to Alice Betty and Height But we can paraphrase it as.
Alice is exactly as tall as Betty What we really have is a 2 place relation between Alice Height has been exorcized The Exorcism paraphrasing awayintensions.
Bachelor and unmarried male have the same meaning Surface grammar again suggest that this says there s a3 place on bachelor unmarried male and a Meaning But we can paraphrase as Bachelor and unmarried male are synonymous.
What we really have is a 2 place relation Meanings intensions have been exorcized Synonomy Synonomy sameness of meaning Even if there are no such things as meanings we can.
make do with synonomy since we can paraphrase away meanings in the way that we paraphrased away heights BUT now we have another problem what is synonomy And we need synonomy to understand analyticity The problem of analyticity confronts us anew .
Two types of analyticity Logical truths If we suppose a prior inventory of logicalparticles comprising no un if then and etc then ingeneral a logical truth is a statement which is true andremains true under all reinterpretations of its components.
other than the logical particles 1 No unmarried man is married The other kind of analyticity 2 No bachelor is married The characteristic of such a statement is that it can be turned.
into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms But we still lack a proper characterization of this second class ofanalytic statements inasmuch as we have had in the abovedescription to lean on a notion of synonomy which is no lessin need of clarification than analyticity itself .
Definition There are those who find it soothing to say that the analyticstatements of the second class reduce to those of the first class the logical truths by definition bachelor for example is definedas unmarried man.
But what do we mean by definition Every definition is either descriptive i e lexicographical orexplicative or stipulative and neither kind of definition will do the Dilemma Stipulative definitions only go for a narrow range of cases.
Lexicographical and explicative definitions assume that wealready understand synonomy for them definition rests onsynonymy rather than explaining it Descriptive definitions Lexicographical dictionary definition.
Bachelor df unmarried male that never has been married But we can ask whether dictionary definitions are correct i e whether they really capture synonomy Explication contextual definition the purpose is toimprove upon the definiendum by refining or supplementing.
its meaning But even explication does rest nevertheless onother pre existing synonomies T he purpose of explicationis to preserve the usage of these favored contexts whilesharpening the usage of other contexts Appeals to pre existing synonomies.
So we re back to synonomy and no wiser Stipulative definition Example definition of logical operators in terms ofprimitives Example if p then q is defined as not p or q .
These definitions aren t arbitrary but depend on purposes informulating artificial languages But all they can deliver is analyticity in L So we can t appeal to truth by definition to understandanalyticity .
InterchangeabilityA natural suggestion is that the synonymy of two linguisticforms consists simply in their interchangeability in all contextswithout change of truth value interchangeability in Leibniz sphrase salva veritate .
Can we understand synonomy as intersubstitutivity salveveritate preserving truth value so that e g bachelor and unmarried male are synonymous comes to For any sentence where bachelor occurs unmarriedmale can be substituted and the truth value of the.
sentence will stay the sameThe question remains whether interchangeability salveveritate is a strong enough condition for synonymy orwhether some non synonymous expressions might be thusinterchangeable .
Cognitive Synonomy W e are not concerned here with synonymy in the sense ofcomplete identity in psychological associations or poetic quality We are concerned only with what may be called cognitive synonymy Compare to Frege s remarks about senses vs ideas.
What we need is an account of cognitive synonymy notpresupposing analyticity Interchangeability salva veritate is meaningless until relativized to a Dilemma In a purely extensional language non synonymous terms are.
intersubstitutable salva veritate A language rich enough to block the intersubstitutability of non synonymous terms presupposes an understanding of analyticity Extensional equivalence isn t synonomy F and G are extensionally equivalent means that all and only Fs.
Fact All and only creatures with hearts are creatures with kidneys BUT creature with a heart and creature with kidneys aren tcognitively synonymous Sam believes that fish are creatures with hearts true Sam believes that fish are creatures with kidneys false.
Sam understands creatures with hearts and creatures withkidneys but knowing what these terms mean doesn t help him Moral extensional equivalence doesn t capture the notion ofsynonomy sameness of meaning that we want Necessity.
Necessarily all and only Fs are Gs does capture synonomy It is not the case that necessarily all and only creatures withhearts are creatures with kidneys It is the case that necessarily all and only bachelors areunmarried men .
If Tom understands what bachelors and unmarried men means then he knows that Dick and Harry are bachelors ifand only if he knows that Dick and Harry are unmarried men So bachelors and unmarried men are cognitivelysynonymous.
But we can t use necessarily But Necessarily all and only Fs are Gs just says that All andonly Fs are Gs is analytic Remember analyticity is what we were trying to explain but We tried to explain it in terms of synonomy and then.
explained synonomy of Fs and Gs in terms of a sentenceusing necessarily But then it turned out that tacking necessarily in front ofa sentence just said that that sentence was analytic So an account of analyticity in terms of necessity is circular .
Intersubstitutivity is language relative The richer the language the less intersubstitutivity we get Example sentences of the form If p then q and Not p orq are interchangeable in the truth functional language ofpropositional logic.
If today is Wednesday then it s sunny But not in ordinary English where if p then q says more Extensional language Quine s example of an extensional language is thelanguage of predicate logic but so is English minus terms.
like necessarily Any two predicates which agree extensionally i e aretrue of the same objects are interchangeable salve veritate in such a language But consider creature with a heart and creature with a.
kidney which are extensionally equivalent I nterchangeability salva veritate if construed in relationto an extensional language is not a sufficient condition ofcognitive synonymy in the sense needed for derivinganalyticity .
A Richer Language Ordinary English a richer language includes words that canonly be understood if we already understand what analyticity is Example NECESSARILY Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men just.
comes to All and only bachelors are unmarried men isanalytic If a language contains an intensional adverb necessarily orother particles to the same effect then interchangebility salvaveitate in such a language does afford a sufficient condition of.
cognitive synonymy but such a language is intelligible only ifthe notion of analyticity is already clearly understood in Interchangeability won t do A language in which interchangeability is sufficient forsynonomy must be richer than a purely extensional.
And the additional stuff will include words like necessarily which we can t understand unless we already understandanalyticity Which is what we were trying to understand in the first The project is circular but sly question are all circles.
Semantical Rules Quine is alluding to Carnap s project which we will largely The jist of his worry here is that appeal to semantical rulesTwo Dogmas of Empiricism The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction and Reductionism The Web of Belief The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges.

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